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A RESEARCH EXEMPTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction
On March 20, 2015, Robert Kastenmeier, who represented
Wisconsin’s Second Congressional District from 1959 to 1991, passed
away at his home in Arlington, Virginia. 1 Though Kastenmeier may not
have been well known outside of legislative circles and his home state of
Wisconsin, he was in fact one of the most prolific policy makers—if not
the most prolific policy maker—in the field of intellectual property law
in the 20th century. He is impressively credited with authoring more
than forty-eight laws dealing with intellectual property matters during
his legislative tenure, including the Copyright Act of 1976, which
remains the primary legal framework for copyright law in the United
States. 2
One of the last bills that Kastenmeier introduced in the House of
Representatives was a major piece of patent reform legislation dubbed
the Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990
(PCTIA). 3 Kastenmeier introduced the bill on September 20, 1990, but
left office less than four months later on January 3, 1991, after losing an
election to Scott Klug. The PCTIA contained five separate titles, and
dealt with subjects as varied as the patentability of inventions made in
outer space to the repeal of state sovereign immunity from infringement
liability. 4 One of those titles, Title IV, garnered little attention at the
time, but addressed a subject of tremendous importance today: the need
to codify and strengthen the long-standing common law research
exemption in American patent law.
I have written elsewhere about the political economy of the research
exemption in American patent law from 1970 to the present day, with an
emphasis on analyzing the political coalitions that have historically
argued in favor of or against such exemptions, and the economic
arguments they often invoke. 5 The purpose of this article, in contrast, is
to carry forward the torch that Kastenmeier lit, and argue in favor of
codifying a robust research exemption. To that end, section two briefly

1. Adam Clymer, Robert Kastenmeier, Liberal Voice in House for 32 Years, Dies at 91, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/us/robert-kastenmeierliberal-house-voice-dies-at-91.html.
2. Id.
3. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).
4. Id.
5. See generally Nicholas Short, The Political Economy of the Research Exemption in
American Patent Law, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 573 (2016).
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explains how the law pertaining to research exemptions has developed
since 1970, with an eye towards understanding what these developments
mean for policy makers. Section three summarizes the findings of
relevant survey evidence and statistical studies. Section four critiques
several scholarly proposals for a research exemption or proposals that
attempt to accomplish similar ends through different means, like the
proposal for creating a “fair use” exception in patent law, or for
modifying the Bayh-Dole Act to give federal funding agencies more
discretion when determining whether the results of publicly-funded
research should be patented. Section five concludes by summarizing the
basic argument in favor of the Robert Kastenmeier Memorial Act, a new
bill to codify a robust research exemption in American patent law.
The Current Legal Framework
The first thing to know about the research exemption in American
patent law is that there are, in fact, three separate exemptions. One
exemption is rooted in the common law, and the other two have a
statutory basis. Supreme Court Justice Story first articulated the
common law exemption (also known as the experimental use defense) in
a case dating back to 1813. 6 Despite this exemption’s deep historical
origins, as well as broad application to all types of patentable subject
matter, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently
interpreted the doctrine in a narrow fashion. 7 As a result, the common
law exemption “does not immunize use [of a patented invention] that is
in any way commercial in nature” nor “any conduct that is in keeping
with the alleged infringer’s legitimate business,” even if that business is
research or education with no commercial intent. 8 To borrow the
Federal Circuit’s own phrasing, the common law exemption continues to
exist, albeit “in a very limited form.” 9
The first statutory research exemption in American patent law was
created in 1970 upon the passing of the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA), which conferred patent-like protection to novel varieties of
plants that reproduce sexually. 10 Like the common law exemption
though, this exemption offers few benefits today. In 1985, an
administrative patent law board determined that those who invent novel
varieties of sexually reproduced plants can obtain a normal utility patent
under the Patent Act and need not seek the special protection of the
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1360.
S. 3070, 91st Cong. (1970).
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PVPA. 11 The Supreme Court sanctioned this view in 2001. 12 As a result
of the Court’s decision, two completely separate statutory schemes
govern the patentability of sexually reproduced plants. Justice Breyer’s
dissent correctly noted that the majority’s decision effectively destroyed
the PVPA’s research exemption because inventors will always choose
protection under the Patent Act over the PVPA. 13
The second statutory exemption in American patent law was created
in 1984 with passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and also applies to a
limited range of inventions, specifically pharmaceuticals and medical
devices. 14 In contrast to the common law and PVPA exemptions, the
pharmaceutical exemption still remains in effect today, and while narrow
in terms of subject matter, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
exemption to be quite expansive in terms of the types of activity the
exemption protects. 15 Overall then, when it comes to the research
exemption, American patent law currently has: a “very limited” common
law exemption; a statutory exemption for the few who still seek
protection under the PVPA; and a strong exemption for drug patents.
For policy makers, a couple key facts about the legal landscape
stand out. First, for more than twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry
has been the one industry where patents arguably play a more important
role than other economic incentives, such as first-mover advantages, in
facilitating research investments. That same industry has also operated
under an unusually strong and broad research exemption, even by
international standards, since 1984. Though there is considerable debate
among economists and other social scientists as to whether patents
actually do more harm than good when it comes to innovation and
research across the economy, 16 there is somewhat more consensus for

11. Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, *2-3 (B.P.A.I. 1985).
12. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).
13. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court has advanced no sound reason why
Congress would want to destroy the exemptions in the PVPA that Congress created. And the
Court’s reading would destroy those exemptions.”). Those who obtain plant patents under the Patent
Act are, of course, still subject to the “very limited” common law exemption described above.
14. The Federal Circuit had the misfortune of attempting, for the first time, to narrow the
common law exemption in a pharmaceuticals case while Congress was debating the Hatch-Waxman
Act. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Congress
quickly amended the Act to repeal that decision. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 26 (1984), as
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2710.
15. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (holding that the
exemption applies to exploratory research and early-stage experimentation).
16. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. OF ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2013 at 1, 5 (finding “weak or no evidence that strengthening patent regimes
increases innovation,” based on a review of 24 separate studies); see also Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S.
Patent System In Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531,
531 (2000).
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the idea that patents play an important role in drug research. 17 Yet drug
research in America is also a broadly protected activity.
Paradoxically, the law currently offers less protection for research
and development in the myriad industries where patents arguably play a
small to negligible role in promoting innovation and investment
compared to pharmaceuticals, and where such an exemption would
therefore be less disruptive to the underlying economic incentives. The
National Science Foundation estimates that American firms increased
drug research spending from $5.5 billion to more than $17 billion
between 1980 and 2003. Additionally, PhRMA, an advocacy group for
pharmaceutical firms, estimates that total drug research spending
conducted in the United States by foreign and domestic firms increased
from $6 billion to $39 billion between 1980 and 2004. 18 These numbers
obviously do not provide a counter-factual for comparison, or suggest
what levels of spending we would have observed in the absence of an
exemption. But they do suggest that drug research investments
consistently and substantially increased for at least 20 years despite the
broad statutory exemption for drug research. Few if any scholars have
confronted this basic fact about the drug research exemption in
American patent law.
Second, the current legal framework also suffers from unnecessary
complexity in part because Congress has historically dealt with the
statutory exemptions in a piecemeal (subject matter-specific) fashion,
and in part because Congress has failed to codify the common law
exemption and has left that doctrine’s interpretation to the judicial
branch. 19 The complexity of having three separate exemptions is
compounded by the fact that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
public universities currently enjoy immunity from all forms of patent
infringement liability (including research-based activity) while private
universities do not. 20 Similarly, state agencies conducting research and
development enjoy immunity while federal agencies do not, even though
the former do much less research than the latter.21 A major benefit of
Congressional action would be to simplify the law and treat all research

17. F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 71 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 171-75 (2009). This point is by no means settled. See
Boldrin and Levine, supra note 16, at 13-14.
18. Congressional Budget Office, Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
Pub. No. 2589, at 7-8 (October 2006).
19. The Federal Circuit’s institutional bias against equitable doctrines, like the research
exemption, means that absent Supreme Court oversight, policy will continue to be made by a Court
adverse to research exemptions.
20. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630
(1999); see also Short, supra note 5, at 596.
21. Id. The federal government has abrogated its own immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
ON
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institutions equally when it comes to immunity from infringement
liability for research activity.
Studies for Guiding Policy
To date, no studies have directly attempted to measure the causal
impact of a research exemption on research or innovation. That is to
say, no studies have attempted to measure how the implementation or
codification of a research exemption—whether general or subject
matter-specific, whether in the United States or elsewhere—influences
research expenditures or proxies for innovation outcomes (like new drug
applications) while controlling for temporal trends and effects not due to
the exemption. 22 This is an area of ongoing inquiry.
However, some survey evidence and a handful of statistical studies
that deal with the overall impact of patents on research and innovation
do provide some data to consider in connection with the debate over the
research exemption. For example, one notable survey found that
proliferating patent rights rarely prevent biomedical researchers from
moving forward, 23 but only because researchers routinely adopt a series
of strategies for coping with the complex patent landscape. 24 And most
of these coping strategies—including willful infringement, sending
research offshore, and litigation—are not necessarily desirable as a
matter of public policy. Other surveys report similar results among
scientists generally, and not just biomedical researchers. 25
On the subject of willful infringement, John P. Walsh and his coauthors note that university researchers “have a reputation for routinely
ignoring patents in the course of their research,” and sometimes invoke a
research exemption as a basis for doing so, perhaps unaware that the
Federal Circuit has significantly narrowed the application of that
doctrine. 26 Walsh and his co-authors also found that “[a] third of the
industrial respondents (and all nine university or government lab
respondents) acknowledged occasionally using patented research tools
22. But see Kevin Iles, A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Experimental Use Exemptions
in Patent Law on Incentives to Innovate, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2005) (making a
general argument based on patent statistics that research exemptions do not seem to drive research
off-shore).
23. Scientists doing clinical research based on diagnostic tests are one major exception. See
JOHN P. WALSH, ASHISH ARORA & WESLEY M. COHEN, EFFECTS OF RESEARCH TOOL PATENTS
AND LICENSING ON BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION, IN PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
318 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1071.
24. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 331-32.
25. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1066-69.
26. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 324-25.
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without a license, and most respondents suggested that infringement by
others is widespread.” 27 The findings make a compelling case for
codifying the research exemption, as the law in its current form is clearly
forcing many American researchers to operate outside of the law in
order to continue pushing the boundaries of scientific and technological
development.
Another troublesome finding is that many research institutions are
willing to send research offshore to avoid the reach of U.S. patents on
research tools or inputs. 28 In this regard, research institutions can exploit
the fact that holders of U.S. patents may not elect to obtain foreign
equivalent patents in every potential research venue, and the fact that
many other countries, including most major trading partners of the U.S.,
have codified some form of a research exemption that provides more
protection for research activity (outside of pharmaceuticals) than U.S.
law does. 29 Thus, in its current form, American patent law may not
necessarily inhibit the progress of scientific investigation within the
global research community, but because American law is so far out of
step with international standards, it may indirectly cause foreign
researchers to gain a competitive advantage on the technological cutting
edge. This result is, on a very general level, inimical to the basic tenets
of American economic policy.
Walsh and his co-authors also found that researchers “worked
around” problems with patents by negotiating a license or litigating over
the patent’s validity, both activities that impose significant costs and
delays on research institutions. 30 Nearly one-third of the survey
respondents indicated “that the process of sifting through a large number
of potentially relevant patents and subsequent negotiations was very
time consuming,” and imposed significant costs and delays on many
biomedical researchers. 31 Walsh and his co-authors also noted that,
setting potential damage awards aside, the costs of engaging in patent
litigation can be significant, often ranging from one to ten million dollars
in attorney’s fees alone for each party to the lawsuit (this study was
published in 2003). 32 Such estimates ignore the true opportunity cost of
27. Id. at 327.
28. Id. at 328.
29. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-39
(describing developments in German and Japanese law); KENNETH A. OYE & RACHEL
WELLHAUSEN, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS AND PROPERTY IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, IN
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES 129-130 (Marcus
Schmidt ed., 2009) (indicating that “Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the UK are among countries with
research exemptions on protected property”).
30. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 322-31.
31. Id. at 315.
32. Id.
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litigation, which makes significant demands on the time of an
institution’s executives and scientists. 33 Another study found that in
1999 the total spent on patent litigation in the United States, across all
technological settings, exceeded $16 billion. 34
The high costs associated with patent licensing negotiations and
litigation is a problem with many roots and potential solutions (and, in
some settings, it is not necessarily a problem in the first instance). But
for purposes of assessing the merits of the research exemption, the more
important question is: why are private and public institutions
increasingly bearing these costs at the research and development phase?
The answer, according to a handful of recent statistical studies, is
that in a setting of cumulative innovation—where each invention is an
input to further work—patent owners have the ability to significantly
stifle follow-on research and innovation, and they are using that power
to slow the pace of technological progress. One such study focuses on
the agreements that the National Institutes of Health negotiated with
DuPont in the late 1990s over the oncomouse, a patented mouse
genetically-modified to be predisposed to developing cancer. 35 Under
those agreements, DuPont had to make oncomice available to academic
cancer researchers on a royalty-free basis with no reach-through rights
on subsequent innovations, 36 thus putting an end to DuPont’s restrictive
licensing practices. 37 The authors found that the “openness shock”
created by the agreements significantly increased levels of follow-on
research according to a variety of proxies, with annual citations
increasing by twenty-one percent. 38
Another study used similar methods to determine whether patentlike contractual provisions inhibited genetic research during the race to
sequence the human genome. 39 The author concluded that the patentlike protection at issue “generated economically and statistically
significant reductions in subsequent scientific research and product
development, on the order of 20–30 percent” for multiple measures of
innovation outcomes and found some evidence that the damage was

33.
34.

Id.
JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 15-16 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 2008).
35. Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on
Innovation 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14819, 2009)
36. Reach-through rights are claims on subsequent inventions developed through use of the
licensed invention. DuPont, for example, did not just demand royalties for use of the oncomice (the
licensed invention), but claimed ownership or a right to royalties in all cancer therapeutics
developed from research using the oncomice. Id. at 12-13.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 23.
39. Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human
Genome, 121 J. OF POL. ECON. no. 1, 2013 at 2.
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permanent. 40 A subsequent study importantly found no reduction in
innovation outcomes in a setting where the underlying technology was
freely available in the human body and researchers could readily ignore
patents, namely with patents on human genes. 41
One additional study extended this type of analysis beyond the
world of biotechnology and found that when the Federal Circuit
invalidates a patent, the ruling causes on average, “a 50 percent increase
in subsequent citations to the focal patent,” but that the effect is
concentrated in fields characterized as technologically complex and
having highly fragmented patent ownership. 42 The authors also
observed that the baseline average estimate is twenty-eight percent
higher if the patent is invalidated during its first fifteen years of life.43
Interestingly, the authors did not observe an increase in citations upon
invalidation of pharmaceutical patents. 44 Since drug research has
benefited from a statutory research exemption that spans almost the
entire time frame that the authors investigated, 45 one possible
explanation is that the “openness” created by an invalidity decision does
not impact pharmaceutical firms because the research exemption has
kept the entire industry relatively open at the exploration and product
development phase. The results of such studies must be interpreted
carefully, but in connection with the data on drug research spending,
these types of findings suggest that we should be skeptical of claims that
research exemptions will upset the fundamental economic dynamics of
the patent system.
The studies mentioned above have more to do with the broader
debate occurring in the social science community over whether patents
play a net positive or negative role in promoting research investment and
technological innovation across the economy. They also focus almost
exclusively on the destructive potential of patents and not on the
investments they incentivize. These studies were not designed to
measure the potential benefits or detriments of implementing a research
exemption in the patent law. Yet they are still relevant. These studies
persuasively suggest that the problem the research exemption is intended
to address—the use of the patent power to interfere with experimentation

40. Id. at 4, 20-22.
41. Bhaven Sampat & Heidi Williams, How do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation?
Evidence from the Human Genome, 3-4, 22-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21666, 2014).
42. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal
Evidence from the Courts, 3-4, 34-35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20269,
2014).
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 3-5, 25-26.
45. The data set includes all decisions involving issues of patent validity from 1982 until
December 2008. Id. at 10-11. The Bolar Amendment was passed in 1984. Pub. L. 98-417.
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as opposed to commercial sales—is very real. They also suggest that the
use of the patent power to interfere with experimentation causes many
researchers to ignore patents, or pursue alternative paths that are not
necessarily desirable as a matter of public policy.
The risks associated with not having a research exemption are
exacerbated when the underlying research is conducted for the public
benefit, an issue often overlooked in analyses concerned only with
investment. The studies discussed above might unintentionally suggest
that most scientific research ultimately has some sort of commercial
intent. In fact, a great deal of scientific research has no commercial
motive at all but instead is intended to assess the health and
environmental consequences of various products and activities for the
benefit of lawmakers. A patent law system without a robust research
exemption therefore permits patent holders to limit or distort public
knowledge about consumer products. This problem became concrete
when Cornell University entomologist, Elson J. Shields, wrote a public
letter to the Environmental Protection Agency in 2009, decrying the
widespread practice among agricultural technology companies of using
patent licensing restrictions to prevent research into the health and
environmental consequences of genetically modified seeds and plants. 46
These types of behavior are contrary to public policy, interfere with the
legislative process, and find no sanction in any of the ideas that form the
basis of American patent law.
Critique of Existing Proposals
Prominent legal scholars have articulated a variety of specific
proposals for codifying a research exemption over the years, though the
subject has not received much treatment within the last decade. Some
have also proposed addressing access problems in the scientific research
community through some other legal mechanism, like creating a patent
law equivalent to the “fair use” exception in copyright law, or modifying
the Bayh-Dole Act in ways that would give federal funding agencies
more discretion to stop the proliferation of patents flowing from
publicly-funded research. Each of these proposals offers concrete
benefits and would be a significant improvement over existing law. But
these proposals also suffer from a variety of pitfalls, pitfalls that have
not been explicitly addressed in the literature. These pitfalls suggest that
an alternative policy—one that simply extends the broad drug research

46. The Editors, Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
August 1, 2009.
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exemption to all patentable subject matter—may make more sense as a
first step towards reform.
Renowned patent scholar Rebecca Eisenberg is widely credited with
articulating the first major modern proposal for codifying a research
exemption, and her 1989 article has had tremendous scholarly impact. 47
Eisenberg’s somewhat conservative proposal has three major planks: (1)
the exemption would reach those who used a patented invention to test
the patent’s validity and the adequacy of the patent’s written description;
(2) the exemption would not apply to research tools—inventions for
which researchers are the primary consumers—unless the use comported
with (1); and (3) all other experimental uses would be subject to a
liability scheme where the patent holder would be deprived of the right
to enjoin or stop the use but would be entitled to recover a reasonable
royalty for the use through litigation. 48 In a related proposal, Janice
Mueller argues that research tools do not deserve the carve-out
articulated in point (2) but should be subjected to the liability scheme of
(3) with one additional caveat: the royalty should expressly include
“reach-through” rights in the value of new inventions developed through
the experimental use. 49
The first plank in Eisenberg’s proposal is well founded both in law
and in public policy. The common law research exemption arguably
embraced experimentation for purposes of testing the invention and its
disclosure before the Federal Circuit’s Madey decision, and so this
aspect of Eisenberg’s proposal simply restores the law to its prior state.
And as a matter of public policy, this aspect of Eisenberg’s proposal
works to ensure that only valid patents are issued and that the public
receives an adequate disclosure in exchange for the patent grant, both of
which are important core principles in the patent system.
The second and third planks, however, are more troublesome. The
proposed carve-out for research tools is based on the unproven premise
that allowing researchers to make or use an invention for
experimentation, without penalty, would significantly undermine the
incentives to develop research tools in the first instance. However, this
cannot be true for all types of research tools. While it may be true for
those inventions that are easily isolated or produced in a laboratory
setting, like a human gene or biological receptor, the premise is not
likely true for other tools like a sophisticated microscope.
For the former class of inventions, the studies described above
suggest that researchers frequently ignore these patents anyway, and
47. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1074-1078 (1989). At present, Eisenberg’s article has
received more than 450 citations in the law review literature alone.
48. Id. at 1078.
49. See Mueller, supra note 29, at 9-10.
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there is no evidence that codifying a research exemption would do more
than normalize existing practice without modifying, in any tangible
sense, the underlying economics. Nor is there any evidence that, to
whatever extent such a change in the patent law would diminish the
desire among institutions to commoditize research inputs, society would
not benefit in the long run from that outcome. Arguably, the federal
government could also compensate for any diminished private interest in
research tool development (if that outcome is actually observed) by
dedicating more public funding to such proposals.
For the latter class of inventions—those that are not readily available
in the laboratory—a research exemption would most likely put a limit on
the patent holder’s ability to set price. 50 Essentially, if the patent holder
sets the price at a level that exceeds the researcher’s opportunity cost of
making the technology in a laboratory setting (or makes licensing
negotiations equally onerous), that would likely cause the patent holder
to lose most if not all of its market. But this price-ceiling aspect of the
research exemption is arguably a beneficial outcome when it comes to
research tools, as it ensures that markets for research tools will perform
more like traditional commodity markets where the next-best
technological alternative restricts the patent holder’s ability to leverage
its monopoly position. In this setting, the research exemption would
also limit the ability of such inventors to control the direction of research
altogether.
The third plank of Eisenberg’s proposal is also problematic because
it mandates resort to an expensive mechanism, litigation, in order to
compensate for certain activities that Congress arguably never intended
to punish when it passed any of the Patent Acts. The risk of promoting
costly litigation is aggravated by the fact that Eisenberg’s proposal
incorporates so many difficult distinctions between protected and
unprotected behavior. For example, even if an alleged infringer
contends that it used a patented invention for purposes of testing the
invention or ascertaining the adequacy of the patent’s written
description, most patent holders might still choose to litigate the
question of whether the experimentation was in fact undertaken for that
purpose and not for some other unprotected purpose. The same holds
true in situations where the patent holder contends that the invention is a
research tool, but the alleged infringer disagrees. In a worst case
scenario, such a scheme would not protect any activity at all so much as
it would force litigation over all types of experimentation, with some
researchers obtaining protection only after spending large amounts on
50. Eisenberg acknowledges as much in her discussion of oncomice. Eisenberg, supra note
47, at 1085 (“But if researchers were free to make the mice on their own, duPont would be limited
to charging no more than the cost to researchers of making the mice in their own laboratories.”).
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attorney fees. Even in those cases that clearly fall within a category of
unprotected activity, determining a “reasonable royalty” for the use, as
Eisenberg admits, is not easy and would require a great deal of input
from both scientific and economic experts. 51 Thus, Eisenberg’s proposal
does not address, and would likely exacerbate, rising litigation costs that
effectively tax public and private sector research. Efforts to protect
research activity through similar reforms, such as Maureen O’Rourke’s
novel proposal to create a “fair use” doctrine in patent law, suffer from
the same fallback, as they force litigation (using multi-factor balancing
tests) to obtain protection. 52
In many respects, Mueller’s modification of Eisenberg’s proposal
only heightens these risks. First, Mueller’s proposal does not simplify
the framework in any material sense. Research tools are not carved out
as unprotected subject matter, in Mueller’s proposal, but are instead
made part of the liability scheme for which injunctive remedies are
unavailable. But because the calculation of the “reasonable royalty” for
research tools would include reach-through rights, a judge would still
have to determine whether or not an invention is in fact a research tool in
order to determine whether reach-through rights are available. Setting
aside the fact that the question of what constitutes a research tool may be
difficult to decide as an evidentiary matter, by incorporating this
distinction into the legal framework, both proposals also undermine the
research exemption at the point it is needed most. Instead of ensuring
that researchers have access to specialized tools that they use on an
everyday basis, Eisenberg and Mueller’s liability schemes assist
researchers only in instances where they are secondary consumers in
large product markets (i.e. if the “research tool” is more like an iPhone
than a microscope). Even then, Eisenberg and Mueller’s proposals only
limit the availability of equitable remedies.
Mueller’s proposal is even more punitive towards researchers, in
some respects, because it codifies and normalizes the controversial
licensing practice of awarding the inventors of research tools a remedy
that includes reach-through rights, meaning rights in the profit stream
from subsequent inventions discovered with the tool. Such rights are
often controversial in licensing negotiations and arguably constitute
patent misuse in many circumstances. Also, in settings where there are
no technological alternatives, such rights exacerbate the patent holder’s
ability to control and stifle subsequent research and greatly amplify
51. Id. at 1078 (“Determination of reasonable royalties is never an easy task.”). The recent
tightening of legal standards for proving damages in patent cases might provide some glimmer of
hope in that patent holders would have to weight their ability to meet those standards when
determining whether to sue.
52. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1177, 1205 (2000).
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infringement liability for those researchers who try to advance the field
despite the patent holder’s restrictive practices. In this regard, Mueller’s
proposal is not a research exemption at all, as it is designed to
significantly amplify the litigation costs and liability exposure for those
engaged in scientific research.
Another group of proposals centers the analysis on either the nature
of the research (whether basic or applied) or the funding source. Thus,
Rochelle Dreyfuss has proposed an exemption for the benefit of “basic
researchers,” a group that could either self-identify by signing a waiver
forgoing future patents rights and/or be legally defined as those who
work in non-profit or educational institutions. 53 Additionally, Arti Rai,
in collaboration with Eisenberg, has proposed amending the Bayh-Dole
Act to give federal funding agencies greater discretion to determine
whether the fruits of publicly-funded research should be patented or
dedicated to the public domain. 54
Each of these proposals offers interesting benefits but could be
improved by broadening the scope of the protection. For starters,
Dreyfuss acknowledges that, since the legislative reforms surrounding
the Bayh-Dole Act in the 1980s, universities and government agencies
collaborate extensively with firms in the private sector and also actively
patent their discoveries. 55 She therefore argues that it would be better to
have “basic researchers” self-identify as undertaking the research for
“noncommercial purposes” rather than provide a legal definition based
on institutional affiliation. 56 In focusing on the researcher’s intent, this
proposal is consistent with the original motivation for the common law
exemption, which was premised on the idea that patent law should not
punish those who use or make an invention for certain experimental
purposes. And if the self-identifying waivers were stored in a central
database available to the public, the system could be administered in a
way that reduces gamesmanship. 57
But more fundamentally, Dreyfuss has not explained why those who
undertake basic research for noncommercial purposes are more
deserving of protection than those who undertake more applied research,
or those who seek to design around an invention with broad commercial
appeal in order to create a technological alternative and more
53. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A CounterProposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course 204-08 (NYU Law Sch. Publ. Law Research Paper
No. 59), http://ssrn.com.abstract=394000.
54. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310-313 (Winter 2003).
55. Dreyfuss, supra note 53, at 205.
56. Id.
57. Without publicly available waivers, most researchers would forego self-identification until
confronted with a dispute, and then use the waivers as an escape from liability. Such a system does
not give researchers the incentive to be clear about their intentions up front.
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competition in the marketplace. In fact, the patent system should seek to
promote and protect these types of activities inasmuch as it also seeks to
promote and protect more basic, noncommercial scientific investigation.
Just as the arbitrary distinctions between research tools and other
inventions do not necessarily make sense in this context, so too do the
traditional dichotomies that the academic community has used to
analyze scientific institutions—public versus private, basic versus
applied, research versus development—fail to provide a solid basis for
delimiting the reach of the research exemption.
Rai and Eisenberg’s proposal approaches the problem from a
somewhat different angle, displaying more attention to the problem of
patent thickets or anti-commons behavior in biomedical research.
Instead of proposing a research exemption, Rai and Eisenberg seek to
limit the proliferation of patent rights in inventions funded with taxpayer
dollars. The proposal is premised on the insight that the traditional
arguments about patent incentives break down when the taxpayer is
footing the bill. 58 To limit patent proliferation, Rai and Eisenberg
propose relaxing the requirements under which a federal funding agency
may depart from the presumption of allowing patent rights to flow to the
fund recipient and altering the way in which courts exercise judicial
review over march-in rights. 59
This proposal has many benefits and would certainly provide a much
needed relaxation in the excessively rigid standards of the Bayh-Dole
legislation. But the main drawback to this approach is that, like
Dreyfuss’s proposal, it is unnecessarily limited in scope and is too
incremental. Because it calls into question the patent rights only of
inventions flowing from federal funds, it will have the most potential
impact in those fields where public research largely drives technological
advance but less impact where private research plays a prominent role.
In this sense, the proposal also may be overly focused on biomedical
innovation without considering alternative technological environments.
It also requires faith in the ability of funding agency officials to
continually monitor technological developments in a given area and
make decisions about the role that patents are playing in either
promoting or interfering with scientific progress, questions that may be
outside the agency’s expertise.
Rai and Eisenberg reject the idea of accomplishing the same ends
through a research exemption, largely out of a sense of caution. 60 They
warn that such exemptions involve legal changes that are “difficult to

58. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 295-300 (“When research is publicly sponsored,
however, the argument for strong patent rights loses much of its force.”).
59. Id. at 310-311.
60. Id. at 299.
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calibrate” in a setting where “the consequences of overdoing it could be
grave.” 61 But they advocate caution based on the importance of private
investment to biopharmaceutical firms, even though all drug research
currently takes place underneath the umbrella of a broad exemption. A
central argument in this paper is that if pharmaceutical research elicits
enormous and increasing amounts of private investment with a robust
research exemption in place, then there is little reason to advocate
caution in extending that protection to other technological fields, most of
which are less dependent on patents for spurring innovation.
Conclusion
The House Judiciary Committee report on Section IV of the PCTIA,
which attempted to codify a research exemption in the patent law,
represents a remarkable departure in thinking about the patent system
compared to previous times. Under Kastenmeier’s leadership, the
Committee abandoned most of the usual platitudes about “incentives”
that characterized then-contemporary debates about the patent system.
Instead, the Committee argued that “[i]t is a central tenet of American
patent law that there is a right to use scientific information to create new
and better inventions in competition with the patented invention.” 62 The
Committee also criticized the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the
experimental use doctrine 63 and concluded that in an era of increasing
public-private partnerships, “government and university scientists should
not be confused about the permissible parameters of their research and
experimentation.” 64 And when it came to discussing the economic
justification for codifying an exemption, the Committee argued that
without such an exemption, “[u]nnecessary litigation occurs, excessive
threats are leveled, transaction costs are raised, . . . experimentation and
research are chilled,” and “[m]ore importantly, legitimate scientific
activities are driven outside the United States.” 65
The specific reform the Committee proposed had its own downfalls.
The most significant concession was the adoption of the “research tool”
carve-out from Eisenberg’s 1989 proposal, which is critiqued above.
The Committee’s report also suggested some confusion over the
proposed law’s reach, as it indicated that “[b]usiness testing is clearly
not an experimental use,” but it did not define “business testing” and so
the thrust of this statement is unclear. In the prior paragraph, the report
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
H.R. REP. 101-960 at 41 (1990).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
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explicitly indicates that experimentation for purposes of designing
around an invention or developing an improvement (both of which are,
broadly speaking, business testing) would not constitute infringement.
Nevertheless, by its plain language, the proposal was rooted in a desire
to create a broad sphere of legally protected activity—not a liability
scheme—and the economic arguments levied in favor of such an
approach remain as true today as in 1991.
Since Kastenmeier’s time in office, social scientists have made
significant progress in identifying the industries where patents play a
constructive role in generating private investment and in analyzing the
potential risks associated with the proliferation of patent rights on
research inputs. Most significantly, we now know that in a setting of
cumulative innovation, patent holders can and do use the patent power to
suppress further research and innovation. We also know that these
effects are not generally observed in environments where researchers
can freely ignore patents or where a robust research exemption is in
place. Survey evidence and some quantitative studies also give meaning
to Kastenmeier’s warning about unnecessary litigation and escalating
transaction costs. This suggests that the legislative remedy should offer a
bright-line safe harbor for research activity, one that does not invoke
tenuous distinctions that will only produce more litigation. American
law in this area is also unnecessarily complex, with three different
research exemptions in place, and sovereign immunity for state, but not
federal, and public, but not private, researchers. American law is also
out of step with international standards, and although many of those
standards also suffer under the weight of litigation-inspiring legal
distinctions, 66 they still offer more protection outside of drug research
than American law does which invites the relocation of research to
offshore locations. All of these factors make the issue of the research
exemption ripe for Congressional review.
For these reasons, Congress should debate and consider legislation
along the following lines:
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the “Robert Kastenmeier
Memorial Act”.

66. In some European countries, with Belgium being a notable exception, many laws try to
distinguish between experimenting “on” as differing from experimenting “with” a patented
invention.
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SEC. 102. RESEARCH EXEMPTION FROM PATENT
INFRINGEMENT.
Section 271 of title 35, United States Code is amended by
adding at the end the following:
“(j) It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use
a patented invention for research, experimentation, or
education. Protected acts of making or using a patented
invention
include:
studying,
evaluating,
or
characterizing such invention or the invention’s written
description; improving upon or creating a product
outside the scope of the patent covering such invention;
testing or evaluating the consequences of such invention
or its commercial embodiments for human health or
safety or for the environment; demonstrating or
manipulating an invention to educate students or
researchers; and any act undertaken solely to advance
the progress of science or the technological arts. This
subsection does not apply to a patented invention to
which subsection (e)(1) applies.”
SEC. 103. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subject to subsection (b), the
amendment made by section 102 shall apply only to
research or experimentation conducted on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(b) APPLICABILITY OF PRIOR SUBSTANTIVE LAW.The substantive law in effect before the date of the
enactment of this Act shall apply to cases arising from
research or experimentation conducted before the date of
enactment.
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